Nested code pairs play a crucial role in the construction of ramp secret sharing schemes [15] and in the CSS construction of quantum codes [14] . The important parameters are (1) the codimension, (2) the relative minimum distance of the codes, and (3) the relative minimum distance of the dual set of codes. Given values for two of them, one aims at finding a set of nested codes having parameters with these values and with the remaining parameter being as large as possible. In this work we study nested codes from the Hermitian curve. For not too small codimension, we present improved constructions and provide closed formula estimates on their performance. For small codimension we show how to choose pairs of one-point algebraic geometric codes in such a way that one of the relative minimum distances is larger than the corresponding non-relative minimum distance.
Introduction
In this paper we study improved constructions of nested code pairs from the Hermitian curve. Here the phrase 'improved construction' refers to optimizing those parameters important for the corresponding linear ramp secret sharing schemes as well as stabilizer asymmetric quantum codes. Our work is a natural continuation of [7] , where improved constructions of nested code pairs were defined from Cartesian product point sets. The analysis in the present paper includes a closed formula estimate on the dimension of order bound improved Hermitian codes, which is of interest in its own right, i.e. also without the above mentioned applications.
A linear ramp secret sharing scheme is a cryptographic method to encode a secret message in F q into n shares from F q . These shares are then distributed among a group of n parties and only specified subgroups are able to reconstruct the secret. A secret sharing scheme is characterized by its privacy number t and its reconstruction number r. The first is defined as the largest number such that no subgroup of this size can obtain any information on the secret. The second is defined to be the smallest number such that any subgroup of this size can reconstruct the entire secret. A linear ramp secret sharing scheme can be understood as the following coset construction. Consider linear codes C 2 ⊂ C 1 ⊆ F n q . Let { b 1 , . . . , b k 2 } be a basis for C 2 and extend it to a basis { b 1 , . . . , b k 2 , b k 2 +1 , . . . , b k 2 + } for C 1 . Here, of course, is the codimension of C 1 and C 2 . Choose elements a 1 , . . . , a k 2 uniformly and independent at random and encode the secret s = (s 1 and similar for the dual codes. The following well-known theorem (see for instance [15] ) shows how to determine the privacy number and the reconstruction number. Theorem 1. Given F q -linear codes C 2 ⊂ C 1 of length n and codimension , the corresponding ramp secret sharing scheme encodes secrets s ∈ F q into a set of n shares from F q . The privacy number equals t = d(C A linear q-ary asymmetric quantum error-correcting code is a q k dimensional subspace of the Hilbert space C q n where error bases are defined by unitary operators Z and X, the first representing phase-shift errors, and the second representing bit-flip errors [2, 21, 14] . In [13] it was identified that in some realistic models phase-shift errors occur more frequently than bit-flip errors, and the asymmetric codes were therefore introduced [13, 19, 5, 16, 25] to balance the error correcting ability accordingly. For such codes we write the set of parameters as [[n, k, d z /d x ]] q where d z is the minimum distance related to phase-shift errors and d x is the minimum distance related to bit-flip errors. The CSS construction transforms a pair of nested classical linear codes C 2 ⊂ C 1 ⊆ F n q into an asymmetric quantum code. From [19] we have With the above two applications in mind, the challenge is to find nested codes C 2 ⊂ C 1 such that two of the parameters ,
attain given prescribed values, and the remaining parameter is as large as possible. In this paper we analyse two good constructions from the Hermitian function field. In the first we consider code pairs such that C 1 is an order bound improved primary code [1, 10] and such that C 2 is the dual of an order bound improved dual code [12] . Considering in this case the minimum distances rather than the relative distances is no restriction due to the optimized choice of codes -the minimum distances d(C 1 ) and d(C ⊥ 2 ) being so good that there is essentially no room for
to hold. For this construction to work, the codimension cannot be very small. For small codimension when d(C 1 ) and d(C ⊥ 2 ) are far from each other we then show how to choose ordinary one-point algebraic geometric codes such that one of the relative distances becomes larger than the corresponding ordinary minimum distance. In particular, this construction leads to impure asymmetric quantum codes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we collect material from the literature on how to determine parameters of primary and dual codes coming from the Hermitian curve, and we introduce the order bound improved codes 1 . In Section 3 we establish closed formula lower bounds on the dimension of order bound improved Hermitian codes of any designed minimum distance. We then continue in Section 4 by determining the pairs (δ 1 , δ 2 ) ∈ {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , n} for which the order bound improved primary code C 1 of designed distance δ 1 contains C 2 , the dual of an order bound improved dual code of designed distance δ 2 . This and the information from Section 3 is then translated into information on improved nested code pairs of not too small codimension in Section 5. Next, in Section 6 we determine parameters of nested one-point algebraic geometric code pairs of small codimension for which one of the relative distances is larger than the non-relative. Finally, in Section 7 samples of the given constructions are compared with known asymmetric quantum codes, with existence bounds on asymmetric quantum codes, and with non-existence bounds on linear ramp secret sharing schemes. Section 8 is the conclusion.
Hermitian codes and their parameters
Given an algebraic function field over a finite field, let = P 1 , . . . , P n , Q be rational places. By H(Q) we denote the Weierstrass semigroup of Q, and we write
The order bound [12, 4] then tells us that if
(which can only happen if λ ∈ H * (Q)), then the Hamming weight of c satisfies
where
The similar bound for the primary case [8, 1, 10] tells us that if
which are both as strong as the Goppa bound, it tells us that for , λ ∈ H * (Q) with < λ it holds that
and similarly
Then we obtain the improved primary code
which clearly has minimum distance at least δ and highest possible dimension for a primary code with that designed distance. Similarly, the improved dual code
has minimum distance at least δ and again the highest possible dimension for a dual code with that designed distance.
Turning to the Hermitian curve x q+1 − y q − y over F q 2 where q is a prime power, it is well-known that the corresponding function field has exactly q 3 + 1 rational places P 1 , . . . , P q 3 , Q. Choosing n = q 3 one obtains H(Q) = q, q + 1 and
In [23] it was shown that
for any λ ∈ H * (Q), and the minimum distance was established for dimensions up to a certain value. The minimum distance for the remaining dimensions was then settled in [26] . In the present paper we shall need improved code constructions, and we will in some cases also be occupied with the relative distances rather than minimum distances. To this end we recall material from [8] on the functions µ and σ -stated there in the more general case of norm-trace curves, but adapted here to the Hermitian case. 
and µ (q
having Hamming weight equal to σ(λ).
Proof. Given a numerical semigroup Λ with finitely many gaps and an element λ ∈ Λ, we know from [12, Lem. 5.15 ] that # Λ\(λ + Λ) = λ. As #H * (Q) = q 3 we therefore obtain σ(iq + j(q + 1)) ≥ q 3 − (iq + j(q + 1)). On the other hand, it is clear that σ(iq + j(q + 1)) ≥ (q 2 − i)(q − j) by the definition of σ. Taking the maximum between these two expressions, we obtain the right hand side of (8) . That these estimates on σ are the true values and that the last part of the proposition holds true both follow as a consequence of [8, Lem. 4] . The details of applying [8, Lem. 4] are left for the reader. Finally, the relation between µ and σ is a consequence of H * (Q) being a box in the parameters i and j, see (6) .
In Appendix A we list a series of lemmas which all follow as corollaries to Proposition 3 and which will be needed in Sections 3 and 4.
Throughout the rest of the paper we restrict to considering codes derived from the Hermitian curve, and we always assume the length to be n = q 3 . From Proposition 3 we see that the bound (4) on the relative distance of
A similar remark then holds for the bound (5) on the dual codes due to (7) . Finally, we observe from [8, Sec. 4 ] that
holds. Proposition 3 therefore not only gives us the true value of the minimum distance of the improved primary codes (without loss of generality we may assume δ = σ(λ) for some λ ∈ H * (Q)), but also does it for the improved dual codes.
We conclude the section with some information on the cases where the improved primary codes coincide with one-point algebraic geometric codes.
This corollary implies that the dimension of E(δ) can be determined from the usual one-point Hermitian codes whenever δ > q 2 −q. For later reference we state these dimensions in terms of δ.
where q 3 − δ = aq + b(q + 1) for −q < a < q and 0 ≤ b < q.
Proof. First, note that in both cases Corollary 4 implies the equality
For the first case recall from [24, Cor. II.2.3] that the code C L (D, λG) has dimension λ + 1 − g whenever 2g − 2 < λ < n. By the assumptions on δ, we have q
By the observation in the beginning of the proof, the same holds true for E(δ).
To prove the second case, observe that the dimension of
By (6) such elements have the form λ = iq + j(q + 1), but equivalently we can write λ = i q + j where i = i + j. By the division algorithm this representation is unique for 0 ≤ j < q. For i q + j to satisfy the requirements of (6), we also require i − j = i ≥ 0. That is, H * (Q) contains the integers whose quotients modulo q are at least their remainders modulo q.
Writing q 3 − δ = (a + b)q + b with 0 ≤ b < q using the division algorithm, the number of elements in H * (Q) less than (a+b+1)q is given by a+b s=0 (s+1). If b ≥ a + b, which happens only if a ≤ 0, this number is also the number of elements with value at most q 3 −δ. Otherwise, the count includes b−(a+b) = a elements of H * (Q) that are greater than q 3 − δ. Hence, subtracting max{a, 0} gives the desired count in both cases.
It remains to establish information on the dimension of E(δ) for δ ≤ q 2 − q since the improved codes differ from the usual Hermitian codes in this case. This subject is treated in the next section.
The dimension of improved codes
As explained in the previous section, the dimension of E(δ) can be determined from well-known methods as long as δ > q 2 − q. In this section we present closed formula lower bounds on the dimension in the remaining cases. We start with an important lemma.
The number of integer points
If δ < q, then the number of integer points is at least
which is stronger than (10).
Proof. The number of integer points in the given Cartesian product is at least that of the volume of
which equals
where we used the substitution z = q 2 − x. Since the number of integer points is integral, we obtain the bound q 2 − δ − δ ln(q 2 /δ) , which is the same as (10). If δ < q, then the number of integer points is at least the combined volumes of
The first mentioned volume equals q 2 − δ 2 . The latter volume is
Adding up the two volumes, we obtain (11) by applying the ceiling function as above.
The dimension of the improved codes of designed distance at most q 2 − q is covered by the following two propositions. Recall from (9) that the equality C(δ) = E(δ) holds for codes defined from the Hermitian function field. Hence, the stated formulas for primary codes also hold for the dual codes.
where −q < a < q and 0 ≤ b < q.
Proof. Let g = q(q − 1)/2 be the number of gaps in H(Q), i.e. the genus of the function field. As is well-known, for 2g ≤ λ < q 3 − 1 the number of ∈ H * (Q) with ≤ λ equals λ − g + 1. Therefore, by choosing λ = q 3 − δ the restriction on δ as given in the proposition implies that there are exactly
These elements then satisfy σ( ) ≥ δ by Lemma 25. From (8) we see that the additional elements in H * (Q) with σ( ) ≥ δ must belong to
Lemma 6 gives an estimate on the total number of elements in (12) with σ( ) ≥ δ. Adding this number to q 3 −δ −g +1, we have counted the elements in (12) with ≤ q 3 − δ twice. By using similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 5, the number of such elements equals a+b s=0 (s + 1) − a when 0 ≤ a < q, and it equals a+b s=0 (s + 1) when −q < a < 0. This proves the proposition.
Proof. By Lemma 30 the elements λ ∈ H * (Q) which do not satisfy σ(λ) ≥ δ must belong to {iq
The number of elements in this set having σ(λ) < δ is bounded above by δ + δ ln(δ) by Lemma 6. Since the total number of monomials in H * (Q) is q 3 , the result follows.
Inclusion of improved codes
As already mentioned our first construction of improved nested code pairs consists of choosing C(δ 2 ) and E(δ 1 ) such that C(δ 2 )
⊥ ⊂ E(δ 1 ). To treat this construction we therefore need a clear picture of the pairs (δ 1 , δ 2 ) of minimum distances that imply this inclusion. We establish this in the present section. As it turns out, the formulas for σ and µ given in Proposition 3 mean that several cases must be considered, and each case is presented as a separate proposition.
In the following, quantifiers on λ, ε are considered on the domain H * (Q).
to be the maximal value of δ 2 such that C(δ 2 )
⊥ ⊆ E(δ 1 ) holds. This inclusion is equivalent to
We first observe that if we can find a λ 1 ∈ H * (Q) such that
is true, then (13) is also true whenever δ 2 ≤ µ(λ 1 ). In particular, we therefore have
On the other hand, we immediately see from (13) that a λ 2 ∈ H * (Q) with
implies the bound
In the proofs of each of the following propositions, our strategy therefore is to determine λ 1 and λ 2 satisfying (14) and (16), respectively, while also satisfying µ(λ 1 ) = µ(λ 2 ). From (15) and (17) it then follows that δ max 2 = µ(λ 1 ). Note, however, that λ 1 and λ 2 need not be distinct. If λ 1 = λ 2 , we shall simply use λ.
With this strategy in mind, the following lemmas will prove very useful.
Proof. For both the cases i < q 2 − q and j = 0, the claim follows by Lemma 26. If i = q 2 − q, Lemma 28 implies that σ(λ) = σ((i + j)q), and any ε ∈ H * (Q) satisfying λ > ε > (i + j)q has σ(ε) ≥ σ((i + j)q) by Lemma 29. This also holds true for ε < (i + j)q by the first part of the proof.
Finally, for i = q 2 − 1 consider ε = i q + j (q + 1) ∈ H * (Q) with ε < λ. If
Proof. This proof is similar to the one of Lemma 9. Defining the notation λ = (q 2 − 1 − i)q + (q − 1 − j)(q + 1), the translation of Lemma 25 into information on µ gives µ(λ) = n − λ whenever
Additionally, if ε ∈ H * (Q) with ε > λ, then ε < λ where the ε is defined in the same way as λ . This implies that µ(λ) < µ(ε) when λ = iq + j(q + 1) satisfies (18) . This immediately proves the claim for i > q − 1.
For i = q − 1 the µ-equivalent of Lemma 28 gives µ(λ) = µ((i − (q − 1 − j)) + (q − 1)(q + 1)), and any elements between have greater µ-value by the translation of Lemma 29. The remaining elements greater than λ are covered by the first part of the proof.
The last part of the proof is j = 0 and i < q − 1, which follows the same procedure as the last part of the proof of Lemma 9.
Proof. Let λ = (q 2 − 1)q + (q − δ 1 )(q + 1). We have σ(λ ) = δ 1 by (8), and Lemma 9 implies that σ(ε) ≥ δ 1 for all ε < λ . Additionally, Lemmas 27 and 29 yield that λ = λ + q + 1 is the smallest element in H * (Q) with a strictly smaller σ-value. Combining this with Lemma 10 applied to λ reveals that λ satisfies (14) . However, (16) is satisfied as well since σ(λ) < δ 1 . Thus, δ
where δ 1 − (q + 1) = aq + b for a ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ b < q.
Proof. First, observe that aq + b ≤ (q − 3)a + (q − 1), meaning that a is at most q − 3.
Assume that b = 0. Then λ = (q 2 − 1 − a)q has σ(λ) = δ 1 − 1, meaning that it satisfies (16) . Note that µ(λ) = q 3 − q 2 − aq + 1, which can be rewritten to obtain the claimed expression.
If 0 < b ≤ a, we can use λ = (q 2 −q−1−a+(b−1))q+(q−1−(b−1))(q+1), which satisfies (16) since σ(λ) = δ 1 − 1. Here, we see that
Finally, for b > a we can let λ = (q 2 − q − 1)q + (q − 1 − a)(q + 1) with σ(λ) = (a + 1)q + a + 1 < δ 1 . Again, λ satisfies (16) . Calculating the value of µ gives µ(λ) = q 3 − q 2 − a(q + 1). In all three of the above situations, the element immediately preceding λ in H * (Q) is given by λ = λ − 1, and the reader may verify that σ(λ ) ≥ δ 1 . In each case applying Lemma 9 to λ implies that σ(ε) ≥ δ 1 for all ε < λ. Lemma 10 applied to λ then shows that λ satisfies (14) as well. In conclusion, the specified values of λ satisfy both (14) and (16), and computing each value of µ(λ) gives the expression in the proposition.
Proof. Set λ = n − δ 1 and observe that λ ≥ 2q 2 − 2q = 4g where g is the genus of the Hermitian function field. Thus, λ is a non-gap in H * (Q), and σ(λ ) = δ 1 by (8). Lemma 9 implies that any smaller element of H * (Q) has σ-value at least δ 1 . We see, however, that λ = λ + 1 has σ(λ) = δ 1 − 1, and it must be the smallest such value. At the same time it meets the requirements of Lemma 10, implying that (14) is fulfilled. As already noted λ satisfies (16) as well, meaning that δ
where q 3 − q 2 − δ 1 = aq + b for a ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ b < q.
Proof. First note that aq + b ≤ (q − 2)q, implying that a is at most q − 2. Assume that b < a and let λ = (q +a−(b+1))q +(b+1)(q +1). This element satisfies the requirements of Lemma 10, and λ − 1 satisfies the requirements of Lemma 9. This means that λ fulfils (14) . Simultaneously, (16) is met since σ(λ) = δ 1 − 1. Thus, δ max 2 = µ(λ) = (a + 1)q + b + 2. Let a = b and λ = (q − 1)q + (a + 1)(q + 1). Applying Lemmas 9 and 10 to λ − 1 and λ as above, we see that λ satisfies (14) . It also meets (16) since σ(λ) = δ 1 − 1. Subsequently, δ max 2 = µ(λ) = (a + 2)q. Now, consider a < b < q − 1 and let λ 1 = (q − 1)q + (a + 1)(q + 1) and λ 2 = (a + 1)q + (q − 1)(q + 1). We can apply both Lemmas 9 and 10 to λ 1 to obtain that it satisfies (14) . On the other hand, σ(λ 2 ) < δ 1 implies that (16) is fulfilled. In addition, µ(λ 1 ) = µ(λ 2 ), which gives δ max 2 = µ(λ 1 ) = (a + 2)q. The remaining part is b = q−1. If this happens, note that λ = (q+a+1)q has σ(λ) = δ 1 − 1, whereas λ − 1 = (a + 1)q + (q − 1)(q + 1) has σ(λ − 1) = δ 1 . By the same arguments as in the first part of the proof, we obtain that δ max 2 = µ(λ) = (a + 2)q + 1.
where q 3 − δ 1 = aq + b for a ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ b < q.
Proof. Assume first that b < a, and set λ 1 = aq and λ 2 = a(q + 1). The latter meets the assumptions of Lemmas 9 and 10, meaning that λ 2 satisfies (14) . Observe that σ(λ 1 ) < δ 1 and µ(λ 1 ) = µ(λ 2 ). From this we see that δ max 2 = µ(λ 1 ) = a + 1. Otherwise, if b ≥ a, let λ = (a + 1)q, which satisfies (16) by the observation that σ(λ) < δ 1 . The element of H * (Q) immediately preceding λ is λ = a(q + 1), which has σ(λ ) ≥ δ 1 . As in the previous proofs, applying Lemmas 9 and 10 to λ and λ, respectively, shows that λ fulfils (14) . Hence, δ max 2 = µ(λ) = a + 2.
It is worth noting that C(δ 2 )
⊥ ⊆ E(δ 1 ) if and only if every λ ∈ H * (Q) with σ(λ) < δ 1 also satisfies µ(λ) ≥ δ 2 . By Proposition 3 this may be rewritten as µ(λ) < δ 1 implying σ(λ) ≥ δ 2 . Hence, the inclusion of codes is symmetric in the sense that C(δ 2 )
⊥ ⊆ E(δ 1 ) if and only if C(δ 1 ) ⊥ ⊆ E(δ 2 ). One could expect that this symmetry would show up in Propositions 11-15 as well. However, this is not the case since the propositions describe the maximal value of δ 2 such that C(δ 2 )
⊥ ⊆ E(δ 1 ) for a given value of δ 1 . Although this implies that C(δ 1 )
⊥ ⊆ E(δ 2 ), there may be a δ > δ 1 such that C(δ )
⊥ ⊆ E(δ 2 ) as shown in Example 1 below. Example 1. Let q = 4 and set δ 1 = 6. Then considering the values of σ and µ as given in Table 4 of the Appendix reveals that the greatest possible value of δ 2 such that C(δ 2 ) ⊥ ⊆ E(δ 1 ) is given by δ 2 = 48. By the observations above we know that this implies C(6)
⊥ ⊆ E(48) as well. However, inspecting the tables again will reveal that the C (8) ⊥ is also a subset of E(48). Notice that both of these observations agree with the formulas in Propositions 12 and 14.
Improved nested codes of not too small codimension
Based on our findings in Sections 3 and 4, we are now able to describe the parameters of our first construction of nested code pairs, namely the one where the codimension is not too small. If δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ H * (Q) satisfy the conditions in one of the Propositions 11-15, it follows that C(δ 2 )
⊥ ⊆ E(δ 1 ). By the bounds (4) and (5) and the observation following Proposition 3, the relative distance of this code pair is exactly d( E(δ 1 )) = δ 1 , and the relative distance of its dual is d( C(δ 2 ) ⊥ ) = δ 2 . For each possible pair of designed distances described in Propositions 11-15, we can combine the dimensions of the usual Hermitian codes with the dimension bounds of Propositions 7 and 8. This gives bounds on the codimension, , of C(δ 2 )
⊥ ⊆ E(δ 1 ).
Proposition 16. Let δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ H * (Q), and δ 1 ≤ q. Further, let δ 2 satisfy the conditions of Proposition 11, meaning that C(δ 2 )
⊥ ⊆ E(δ 1 ). Denote their codimension by . If δ 2 ≤ q, then
where a and b are as in Proposition 7 applied to δ 2 . If q 2 − q < δ 2 < q 3 − 2g + 2, then
Finally, if q 3 − 2g + 2 ≤ δ 2 , we have
where q 3 − δ 2 = aq + b(q + 1) for −q < a < q and 0 ≤ b < q.
Proof. By Proposition 8 we have
. In each case, we can obtain a bound on the codimension by subtracting an upper bound on C(δ 2 )
In turn, such a bound can be obtained via a lower bound on dim E(δ 2 ).
In the case δ 2 ≤ q the dimension of E(δ 2 ) can again be bounded by Proposition 8. In the second case the bound on dim E(δ 2 ) follows by Proposition 7. Proposition 5 delivers the bounds in the two final cases.
Proposition 17. Let δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ H * (Q) and q < δ 1 ≤ q 2 − q. Further, let δ 2 satisfy the conditions of Proposition 11, meaning that C(δ 2 )
⊥ ⊆ E(δ 1 ). Denote their codimension by and let a 1 , b 1 be as in Proposition 7 applied to δ 1 . If δ 2 ≤ q, then
where a 2 and b 2 are as in Proposition 7 applied to δ 2 . Finally, if q 2 − q < δ 2 , then
Proof. We use the same strategy as in the proof of Proposition 16. A bound for the dimension of E(δ 1 ) can be found in Proposition 7. For δ 2 ≤ q the bound on dim E(δ 2 ) comes from Proposition 8, and in the case q < δ 2 ≤ q 2 − q it comes from Proposition 7. In the final case the bound follows from Proposition 5, where we note that δ 2 ≤ q 3 − 2g + 2 by Proposition 12 and the assumption on δ 1 .
Proposition 18. Let δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ H * (Q) and q 2 − q < δ 1 < q 3 − 2g + 2. Further, let δ 2 satisfy the conditions of Proposition 11, meaning that C(δ 2 )
⊥ ⊆ E(δ 1 ). Denote their codimension by . If δ 2 ≤ q, we have
where a and b are as in Proposition 7 applied to δ 2 . Finally, for q 2 − q < δ 2 we have
Proof. Again, the the strategy is the same as in the proof of Proposition 16. The exact dimension of E(δ 1 ) is given by Proposition 5. For δ 2 ≤ q the dimension of E(δ 2 ) can be bounded by applying Proposition 8, and in the case q < δ 2 ≤ q 2 − q the bound follows by Proposition 7. For the final case we note by Proposition 13 that δ 2 < q 3 − q 2 + q + 2 − (q 2 − q) = q 3 − 4g + 2. Hence, the exact dimension of E(δ 2 ) is given by the first part of Proposition 5 in this case.
Proposition 19. Let δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ H * (Q) and q 3 − 2g + 2 ≤ δ 1 . Further, let δ 2 satisfy the conditions of Proposition 11, meaning that C(δ 2 )
⊥ ⊆ E(δ 1 ). Denote their codimension by . Then
where q 3 − δ 1 = aq + b(q + 1) for −q < a < q and 0 ≤ b < q.
Proof. The dimension of E(δ 1 ) is given by the last part of Proposition 5. To obtain a bound on the maximal value of δ 2 , note that the the minimal value of q 3 −δ 1 can be written as q 2 −q −2 = q(q −2)+(q −2). Proposition 15 now implies δ 2 ≤ q. Hence, dim E(δ 2 ) ≥ q 3 − δ 2 +δ 2 ln(δ 2 ) by Proposition 8.
The application of Theorem 1 or 2 translates Propositions 16-19 into information on improved linear ramp secret sharing schemes and improved asymmetric quantum codes, respectively. The details are left for the reader.
6 Improved information on nested codes of small codimension
We will now consider a second construction which in general gives nested code pairs of smaller codimension than the construction in Section 5. This construction bears some resemblance to the one given in [7, Sec. IV], but in the setting of Hermitian codes. From the definition of the codes,
whenever λ 2 < λ 1 and both λ 1 and λ 2 belongs to H * (Q). Our second construction is captured by the following two propositions.
Proposition 20. Let λ 1 = iq+j(q+1) ∈ H * (Q) where i ≤ j < q, and define
and
The inequality in (20) is strict if and only if i = 0 and j = q − 1.
is given by the number of elements ε in H * (Q) with λ 2 < ε ≤ λ 1 . By (6) H * (Q) contains every integer between λ 2 and λ 1 , meaning that the codimension is exactly
To prove the first equalities in (19) and (20), we use Proposition 3 to obtain σ(λ 1 ) = q 3 − λ 1 and µ(λ 2 ) = (i + 1)(j + 1). Applying (4) and (5) then implies that the relative distances are at least q 3 − λ 1 and (i + 1)(j + 1), respectively. That these are indeed equalities follows from the observations following Proposition 3.
In (19) the last equality follows from the last part of Proposition 3. For (20) the observations in [8, Rem. 4] imply that (3) is in fact an equality.
⊥ is given by µ((i+j)(q+1)) = i + j + 1 if i + j < q and
otherwise. In the first case equality with (i + 1)(j + 1) occurs if and only if i = 0, and in the second if and only if j = q − 1.
In the above construction we only consider values of i less than q. A similar technique can be used for q 2 − q ≤ i < q 2 . We state the proposition, but omit the proof since it follows by similar arguments as above.
The inequality in (21) is strict if i = 0 and j = q − 1.
By applying one of Theorems 1 and 2, we can transform Propositions 20 and 21 into information on improved linear ramp secret sharing schemes and improved asymmetric quantum codes, respectively. The details of this translation are left for the reader.
Comparison with bounds and existing constructions
Having presented two improved constructions of nested code pairs in Sections 5 and 6, this section is devoted to the comparison between the corresponding asymmetric quantum codes and codes that already exist in the literature. The codes are also compared with the Gilbert-Varshamov bound for asymmetric quantum codes. Moreover, we compare the corresponding secret sharing schemes with a recent lower bound on the threshold gap [3] . When presenting code parameters we give the actual codimension rather than using the estimates in Section 5 which rely on the bounds in Propositions 7 and 8.
Since the codes obtained in Sections 5 and 6 are relatively long compared to the field size, the literature does not contain many immediately comparable codes. Yet, one way to obtain such codes is by using Construction II of La Guardia [17, Thm. 7 .1], which gives asymmetric quantum generalized Reed-Solomon codes. Adjusting the theorem to codes over F q 2 gives the following result. Example 2. By using different values for the parameters in Theorem 22, we obtain asymmetric quantum codes of varying lengths. If the chosen parameters give a code of length less than q 3 , we can pad each codeword with zeroes in order to obtain the correct length. Note that this does not change the relative distance of the nested codes nor of their duals.
For q = 3 Table 1 lists the best code parameters that can be obtained in this way together with the comparable codes from the constructions in Sections 5 and 6. In the third column, the parameter d z is maximized under the condition that the dimension and the distance d x are at least as high as in [17] . In the fourth, the dimension is maximized, keeping at least the same minimal distances. As is evident, the codes of the present paper perform very favourably.
We further note that all presented new codes exceed the Gilbert-Varshamov bound for asymmetric quantum codes [18, Thm. 4] . Additionally, we remark that nesting usual one-point Hermitian codes and using the Goppa bound does not provide asymmetric quantum codes as good as the ones in columns three and four.
The two constructions in Theorem 24 and Corollary 29 of [7] based on codes defined from Cartesian product point sets provide another way to obtain asymmetric quantum codes that can be compared to the ones in this paper. We summarize these constructions in the following two theorems. (m − + 3)(m + + 1). The two distances may also be interchanged.
Construction of [17, Thm. 7.1] This paper (m1, m2, k, c) Code dz maximized maximized Table 1 . Asymmetric quantum codes of length 27 over F 9 . The first column states the parameters used in Theorem 22 to obtain the codes in the second. If necessary, these have been padded with zeroes to obtain length 27. The codes in the third and fourth columns are based on the construction in Sections 5 and 6.
Example 3. By using different parameters in Theorems 23 and 24 and padding with zeroes if necessary, we obtain the asymmetric quantum codes presented in Table 2. This table also [18, Thm. 4] , and the Goppa bound applied to nested one-point Hermitian codes cannot provide such parameters.
Some codes over F 9 are presented as well. These codes do, however, have a length that is at least 36.
When presenting constructions of codes, it is customary to compare it to tables of 'best known' linear codes such as [20, 11] . Unfortunately, similar tables do not exist for asymmetric quantum codes. As we shall recall in a moment, however, one can still measure asymmetric quantum codes against the usual bounds on linear codes.
Before doing so, we observe that the tables in [11] only contains alphabets up to F 9 , whereas [20] has F 256 as its largest alphabet. As indicated by the following example, however, the latter tables are generally not as optimized as the ones by [11] .
Example 5. In some cases the improved codes E(δ) exceed the codes given by [20] . For instance, when considering codes over F 16 , the codes E(12), E (9) , and E (8) Recall from Section 6 that our second construction of nested code pairs (which are code pairs of small codimension) gives impure asymmetric quantum codes. This is already an advantage as the error-correcting algorithms can take advantage of the impurity. Another advantage of considering relative distances rather than only minimal distances emerges when analysing the error-correcting ability of asymmetric quantum codes. In order to illustrate this advantage, we can compare nested codes from the construction in Section 6 with pairs of best known linear codes from the tables in [11, 20] . Note that the pairs of best known linear codes from such tables generally do not result in nested code pairs; that is, they are not guaranteed to satisfy the requirement that the dual of one code is contained in the other. The comparison with tables of best known linear codes is done in the following example. Whenever the tables of [20] are considered, we will use the minimum distance of an improved algebraic geometric Goppa code from the Hermitian curve if this exceeds the table value as in Example 5. 
. This is the same method as used in [7] , and bears resemblance to the idea in [6, Thm. 2] . Using this procedure it is in no way guaranteed that C ⊂ C. However, as shown in Table 3 the construction in Section 6 is in many cases on par with the best known codes, while simultaneously guaranteeing the inclusion C 2 ⊂ C 1 . In some cases the use of relative distances will even exceed the values obtained from the best known codes. As in the previous examples, the codes in Table 3 all exceed the Gilbert-Varshamov bound for asymmetric quantum codes [18, Thm. 4] .
Turning to secret sharing schemes, [3] presents a lower bound on the threshold gap r − t. That is, the authors bound the smallest possible difference between the reconstruction number r and the privacy number t for q-ary linear ramp secret sharing schemes with n shares and secrets from from F q . For linear ramp secret sharing schemes over F q 2 , they show that r ≥ t + (q 2m − 1)(n + 2) + (q 2m+2 − q 2m )( − 2m)
for every m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , − 1}. Of course, one should choose the m that gives the best bound. Comparing the secret sharing schemes obtained in this paper with the bound (22) helps to quantify how optimal the construction is. This is done in the following example, which also illustrates the advantage of using the improved codes from Section 5 and the improved information from Section 6 rather than relying solely on the Goppa bound applied to nested one-point Hermitian codes.
Constructions of [7] This paper Type (s, m) Code dz maximized maximized Goppa only This paper Lower bound Figure 1 . The minimal achievable reconstruction number r given a desired privacy number t. The plots show the constructions from Sections 5 and 6, a construction using the Goppa bound only, and the lower bound from (22) .
Example 7. In each of the plots in Figure 1 , a desired privacy number t has been fixed. For each codimension the plots then show the minimal reconstruction number r achievable with the constructions from Sections 5 and 6 when privacy number at least t is required. The plots also show the lower bound in (22) .
Recall that the codes under consideration have length q 3 , meaning that the four corresponding secret sharing schemes support 27, 64, 125, and 343 participants, respectively. As the plots demonstrate, the constructions of this paper provide secret sharing schemes with parameters that could not be obtained by using nested Hermitian one-point codes and the Goppa bound alone.
We remark that the four given examples use a relatively large privacy parameter t. Yet, it is also possible to obtain improved reconstruction numbers for small values of t.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we presented two improved constructions of nested code pairs from the Hermitian curve, and gave a detailed analysis of their performance when applied to the concepts of secret sharing and asymmetric quantum codes. Regarding information leakage in secret sharing we studied the reconstruction number r and the privacy number t, which give information on full recovery and full privacy, respectively. We note that it is possible to obtain information about partial information leakage by studying relative generalized Hamming weights rather than just relative minimum distances [15, 9] . For asymmetric quantum codes we applied the CSS construction. Applying the method of Steane's enlargements [22] is a future research agenda.
